Introduction
Wenzhou has been called 'China's Jerusalem' for its high percentage of Christians, and the city is well known for its relaxed church-state relations. However, in March 2014, the local government gave an order to demolish parts of Sanjiang Church, a magnificent building that stood on a rocky promontory in Yongjia County near Wenzhou, because they claimed that it violated zoning regulations. This church was a landmark and the pride of Christians in this region. In response to the order, more than 3,000 Christians arrived to defend the church, which temporarily halted demolition.
Government officials finally took action on 28 April, which again drew several thousand Christians to the church to guard the building. On that day, the local government called for thousands of police to surround the church, and the entire church was demolished by bulldozers (Johnson 2014) .
At the same time, the local government launched another intimidating political campaign targeting Christian churches in Zhejiang Province-the removal of crosses from its churches. From February 2014 to August 2015, 1200 crosses were removed from the rooftops of the churches in the region (Jiang, 2015) . During this campaign, Christians flocked to the churches and staged protests, which often led to confrontation with the police. In some cases, Christians were brutally beaten by police as they tried to defend the churches with their bodies. 1 Wenzhou generally has been considered a city of booming economic growth, as well as a region with relaxed ties between the church and the state. Some researchers have asserted that a new form of church-state relations is in the making in Wenzhou in this post-Mao reform era (Cao 2007; Chen 2005; Chen & Huang, 2004) . However, the demolition of Sanjiang Church and the removal of crosses from the churches in Zhejiang Province has projected another view, that of renewed church-state tensions.
The demolition of churches and church properties in Wenzhou began in the 1990s. In First, the theoretical framework of this study is explained, followed by a brief introduction to the history of the Catholic Church in Wenzhou. Next, analysis of the Wenzhou model of church-state dynamics from the perspective of institutional theory is provided. Finally, the direction of change drawn from the research findings, reflecting the issue of religious freedom as interpreted by institutional theory, is discussed.
Institutional theory and church-state relations
Church-state relations in China have been an important issue and a much debated subject for researchers over the last 20 years. The widely accepted model explaining church-state relations in China is the model of dominance and resistance (Bays, 2004; Madsen, 1998 Madsen, , 2004 Potter, 2003) .
In recent years, researchers have attempted to employ institutional theory to examine church-state dynamics in China. These researchers investigated how various actors have attempted to implement the modern category of 'religion' in China and the consequences of this action in both religious and state institutions. As explained by Ashiwa and Wank (2009, 8) , the concepts 'institutions' and 'institutionalization' are key to the theory. Institutions refer to 'rules that constitute community, shaping how individuals see themselves in relation to others and providing a foundation for purposive action,' whereas institutionalization refers to 'the process by which situations adapt to institutions.' Ashiwa and Wank (2009, 3-6) have criticized two prevalent methods in the study of state and religion in China, namely the 'dichotomous framework of antagonism and conflict,' and the 'dichotomous framework [that] locates conflict between state and religion in the context of [the] state's modern hegemonic discourse of nation, science, and development.' Institutional theory is superior to these models, they have argued, because its takes into consideration multiple actors and political processes in the interaction between state and religion, including competition, adaptation, cooperation and conflict. Moreover, in the process of institutionalizing 'religion', both state and religion are mutually constitutive.
Following Ashiwa and Wank, Cao (2011) According to Cao, Chinese people living along the coastal regions in East China have enjoyed unprecedented economic development and material prosperity during the post-Mao reform era, which brought huge fortunes to a new generation in the 1990s and 2000s, many of whom were Christians in Wenzhou. Different from the house-church Protestants who were mainly old, poorly educated females, the new generation of Protestants is comprised of young wealthy males. Cao called these Protestant entrepreneurs 'boss Christians'. Many of these boss Christians were of rural origin, but are now private business owners, hence the ppithet 'boss'. These boss Christians have publicly acknowledged being blessed by God in their business success (Cao, 2008, 63-64) . Most importantly, they have introduced changes in the values, organization, and management of the church with their entrepreneurial way of thinking and practices. According to Cao, the Protestant entrepreneurs …internalized the postsocialist mode of governance and adopted a strategic approach to engaging with state religious governance. Some highly ambitious individuals have taken advantage of the existing political and economic system to disseminate faith and in so doing they engage in remaking church-state relations (Cao, 2011, 41 ).
The old model of dominance and resistance was therefore no longer appropriate in explaining church-state relations in Wenzhou in the post-Mao reform era.
Institutional theory, as advocated by Ashiwa and Wank, and the empirical study conducted by Cao have provided a new perspective of research on church-state relations, or state-religion relations, in China. The present study seeks to examine the relationship between the Catholic Church and the state from the perspective of institutional theory. It will also examine whether Catholics in Wenzhou display characteristics similar to those of the Protestants described by Cao, assuming that they all belong to the Christian family.
Data and methods
This research project used fieldwork to collect data in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province.
The study of the Catholic Church in China today continues to be very sensitive.
Fieldwork has allowed researchers to collect data in Catholic dioceses in a flexible way by meeting and interviewing clergy and laity from both open and underground churches. The interviews in this study were conducted through the snowball sampling method, in that the Catholic Church in Wenzhou was recommended by a researcher of the Catholic Church in Hong Kong, and the contact person of the Catholic Church in Wenzhou recommended key people from different factions in the Catholic community there.
Fieldwork was conducted in the diocese of Wenzhou on two separate occasions. and 10 people were interviewed, including Catholic priests and laity in both open and underground churches. The different views of the priests and laity in the two hierarchies on certain events and issues were useful in confirming the information gathered and in understanding the complexity of the related issues. The second trip was conducted in January 2009. The purpose of that fieldwork was to conduct further in-depth interviews and to validate the information collected during the first trip.
Preliminary research findings were shared with the interviewees and in turn they shared their feedback. To protect the interviewees' safety, their identities and titles have been concealed in this article.
Changing church-state relations in Wenzhou
The Wenzhou Diocese is located in the southern part of Zhejiang Province, and its 
Imposition of State Institutions on Religion
The key actors representing the state institutions that impose laws, policies and regulations on religion are the Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) and the Public Security Bureau (PSB). In addition, the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA)
is a state-controlled organization whose function is to support national policies.
The RAB is a state organization at the provincial level under the State Administration for Religious Affairs. There are equivalent units at the municipal, county, and even township/village levels. The official mandate of the RAB is …to study and propose policies and guidelines for the work related to religious affairs, formulate and implement such policies and guidelines,… guide and promote religious circles to conduct their activities within the framework of law and policies and protect citizens' freedom of religious belief. (Chan and Carlson, 2005: 6-7) The PSB is responsible for security at the provincial level under the Ministry of Public Security. Generally, cadres at the PSB deal with religious activities that are not officially recognized by the authorities (Chan and Carlson, 2005: 8) . For instance, the unregistered underground Catholic Church is considered illegal by the authorities; as such, the PSB can enforce the law against underground churches, including arrests and detentions.
The CCPA is one of seven religious associations for the five recognized religions established by the state. Generally, the task of the seven religious associations is to ensure that religious activities remain within government-set parameters (Chan and Carlson, 2005: 15) . The CCPA carries out its work in close association with the government, and the leaders of the CCPA publicly echo the policies of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Practically, the CCPA has been promoting 'the principle of independence' (duli zizhu 獨立自主) and encouraging Catholics 'to take the management of churches into their own hands' (zhiban jiaohui 自辦教會). These slogans are meant to coerce the Catholic Church in China to cut ties with the Vatican and the Pope and elect and ordain bishops on its own, without regard to the Pope (endorsing zixuan zisheng 自選自聖, 'self-election and self-consecration').
This study covers the period from 1980 to 2015. During this period, four different phases of interaction between the state and the Catholic Church were identified. The first phase (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) . This campaign against church influence, the reasons for which have yet to be studied, is continuing in Zhejiang today.
Various responses to state institutions by the Catholic Church
The key actors of the church (i.e. the clergy and laity) in different factions within the Catholic community chose their own political positions in reaction to coercion by state institutions, and such positions have been changing over the last 30-plus years.
This study identified four different reactions, namely, accommodation, negotiation, confrontation, and resistance. In the following sections, these reactions are examined in detail.
It is noteworthy that the Vatican has played an important role in affecting the key actors of the Catholic Church in China. Since the 1950s, the Vatican has refused to accept the CCPA as part of the Catholic Church in China. In 1988, Cardinal Josef Tomko, Prefect of the Congregation for the Evangelization of Popes, issued the 'Eight-Point Directive on Dealing with China', which makes the following remarks:
The Catholic Doctrine clearly affirms that only those are fully incorporated into the society of the Church who accept her entire system and all means of salvation given to her, and through union with her visible structure are joined to Christ, who rules her through the Supreme Pontiff and the Bishops. This joining is effected by the bonds of professed faith, of the sacraments, of ecclesiastical government and of communion. (Tomko, 1988) The directive explicitly stated that as the pope is the Head of the Catholic Church, Catholics should not accept the CCPA because it denies the leadership of the pope.
Moreover, those who conduct or accept consecrations without the Pope's approval can be subject to 'latae sententiae excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See' (Lam, 1997: 172-176) .
If the state institutions of religion were a political mechanism at work, then the Vatican was a more powerful religious institution, providing values, norms, and directives to Catholics in the same space and time. The state offers political legitimacy whereas the Vatican offers religious legitimacy. The two institutions were in conflict because the Chinese government and the Vatican disagree on a number of issues. Therefore, the clergy and laity had to make their own choice regarding which authority to side with.
Accommodation
In the restoration of religion phase, a small number of clergy and laity chose to accommodate state institutions. Early in 1958, the government established the CCPA in Wenzhou. After the Cultural Revolution, the government intended to revive the CCPA, but most of the clergy and laity refused to take part in the organization. The government could find only three people in the church to work in the CCPA office in 1979: Bishop Fang Zigang 方志剛, Chen Dafu 陳達夫, and Lin Bin 林彬. During that time, Chen was the chairman of the CCPA and Bishop Fang was the vice-chairman. The CCPA office was located in the city of Wenzhou's diocesan curia.
However, most of the clergy in the diocesan curia held that Bishop Fang, Chen, and
Lin had betrayed the Pope and thus they isolated these three pro-government fellow Catholics. As a result, the government's instructions and commands were, on the whole, ineffective.
Father Cai Shuyi 蔡叔毅 took over the CCPA when Chen and Bishop Fang retired. In the 1950s, Cai sided with the government and became its spokesperson during a time of political turmoil, which earned him a bad name for betraying the which he could work for both the state and the Church. He also used his power in the CCPA to reclaim many church properties confiscated by the government. In doing so, he was recognized by the Catholic community as standing with the church, although he also worked for the CCPA. had no function; the election took place, but it was void').
The incident of the episcopal election showed that state institutions were largely ineffective in implementing their policies and regulations, while the religious institution of the Vatican proved to be much stronger. Most of the clergy and laity considered religious legitimacy to be more important than political legitimacy. As a result, the clergy and laity who chose to accommodate state institutions were sidelined by the majority of the Catholic Church.
Negotiation
The clergy and laity in the city of Wenzhou chose to negotiate with state institutions,
holding the position that they should face up to the government rather than keep hiding underground. Moreover, the clergy and laity believed that they should engage in 'dialogue' (duihua 對話) with government officials, defending the principles of the Then, a group of clergy began to negotiate with government officials, proposing four principles for cooperation. The terms were as follows:
1. The ACCCC in Wenzhou holds that the pope is the head of the Catholic Church;
2. Those priests and laity who betray the pope are not allowed to take part in the ACCCC in Wenzhou;
3. The ACCCC in Wenzhou has no hierarchical relationship with the ACCCC in Beijing and the 'two associations, one conference,' 6 and will not follow their path in dissociating from the pope; and 4. The clergy are willing to comply with the laws and government policies on the condition that these laws and policies do not violate Catholic doctrines and teaching.
Government officials agreed to these terms, which led to a group of clergy surfacing to work in the open church. The principles came to be known as the "Four Principles The first principle asserted that the Pope, not the state, was the leader of the church.
The second and third principles declared that the diocese of Wenzhou was independent from pro-government Catholic organizations, and that the pro-government clergy and laity of Wenzhou must be excluded from the ACCCC. The fourth principle states the condition for cooperation with the government: the Catholic faith comes first if there was a conflict between Catholic doctrines and state policies.
In sum, the 'Four Principles of Huaqiao Hotel' upheld papal supremacy and downplayed state institutions.
Confrontation
Another group of clergy and laity chose to defy state institutions. They organized the On 15 August 1995, PSB officials from Zhejiang and Wenzhou went to Longgang and banned the association and its newspaper. The reason for these bans, according to the PSB officials, was that both the association and the newspaper were illegal. The young lay leaders retorted to the officials that they had tried to register the association with the Civil Affairs Bureau in Wenzhou, but were told that the church already had a legal status, so registration for the association was not required. Likewise, the Herald was an internal publication of the church and was not for sale, and as such it should also enjoy a legal status. The PSB officials ignored these explanations and proceeded to search the association's central office and the houses of the young lay leaders.
Finally, they issued a fine of RMB 80,000 (US$12,278) to the church.
Another incident was the demolition of the church's administrative building by the local government. In 1996, Longgang Church bought the land next to it from a factory and submitted a construction application to the Bureau of Land and Resources for an administrative building. The application was subsequently approved by the Bureau of Urban Planning. However, when the building was in the process of construction up to the third level, the local government gave an order to demolish the building. The reasons for its demolition, according to the government officials, were that the church had changed the function of the building and the building breached the rules set by the government. The clergy and laity considered such reasons unconvincing and they employed a lawyer from Beijing to sue the local government.
The church won the first round of litigation, but the lawyer decided to back down.
The lawyer told the clergy that there was no hope of winning the case because the litigation was a political matter. Ultimately, the church lost the lawsuit.
After two years, the church submitted the construction application again, and the construction plan was the same as the previous one. The government officials did not ban the construction this time, and the administrative building was completed in 1999.
I asked interviewee 6 why government officials allowed the construction to be completed a second time. 9 He said that the demolition in 1996 was a second warning given to the clergy and laity, which was related to the incidents of the YPAE and the newspaper Herald, meaning that the church should have submitted to the authority of the government.
In 1999, Longgang Church faced another maneuver of tightening control from the government. In that year, the local government forced the clergy and laity to take were largely passive, obedient, and submissive to the clergy. 12 The boss Catholics in
Wenzhou took a more active role in church planning and development, and they bravely faced up to government officials when negotiating with them. Undoubtedly, their experience as businessmen and their problem-solving abilities were key factors in their choice to resist church-state relations. In this light, the phenomenon described by Nanlai Cao, in which he observed that many Protestant entrepreneurs administered the church by introducing their own business strategies and practices and that they actively built a cooperative relationship (guanxi) with local government officials, was not found in the Catholic Church.
One possible explanation for these differences between the Catholic and Protestant churches in the same area of Wenzhou was organizational differences. The
Catholic Church had its own religious hierarchy, including the ecclesiastical structure and doctrinal unity conforming to orders from the Vatican. All Catholics, including boss Catholics, had to comply with the hierarchy and order of the Church. Moreover, individual Catholics cannot change these orders at will. In contrast, boss Protestants had the freedom to insert their entrepreneurial ambitions into their church mission. Another concession made by government officials was the establishment of the CCPA in Cangnan in 1999. The government agreed to insert a confession of faith into the Wenzhou Constitution of the CCPA. Agreeing to insert this confession of faith was equivalent to accepting papal supremacy and the hierarchy of the Catholic Church.
Discussion and conclusion
Such compromises and concessions might have been an act of expediency adopted by government officials. However, they would have found it more difficult to ask the Catholic clergy to follow the commands of the CCPA unless they allowed that the religious legitimacy of the Pope overrode the political legitimacy of the state.
Since the 1980s, government policies have worked like a pendulum swinging between the 'hard' and 'soft' way of managing institutions depending on social circumstances. Regarding the Catholic Church, after the Cultural Revolution, the government expressed its good intentions by asking the underground clergy to work in the open church. As the Church grew rapidly under the more relaxed environment, and both the Catholic population and Church influence were on the rise, government officials tightened their control on the Church. However, when the government's 'hard' policies met with the clergy's resistance, the government swung back to the 'soft' method of management. In 2014, in an effort to control the Church using 'hard' methods once again, the government began removing crosses and demolishing church The changing attitudes among the clergy in their interaction with government officials are crucial to advancing the limited religious freedom in Wenzhou. Among the four factions in the Catholic Church, the choices of accommodation and confrontation have proved to be deficient. Those who chose accommodation had to work for the CCPA, which was isolated from the majority of the clergy, while those who chose confrontation had no legal status and they could not administer the church openly. On the contrary, the choices of negotiation and resistance have proven to be more desirable. Those who chose negotiation could administer the church openly with their legal status and they could deal with government officials in negotiations, which led to the latter making concessions. If government officials refused to concede, the clergy could resist the local government in its implementation of policies and regulations. It is in these choices of negotiation and resistance that the Catholic Church in Wenzhou has been able to expand its limited space of religious freedom.
The church-state relations in Wenzhou also provide a useful case for theoretical reflection. Institutional theory is a more flexible and inclusive conceptual framework The case of Wenzhou Diocese is also useful in comparing the behaviour of Catholics and Protestants in Wenzhou. Neither the church-state relations described by Cao Nanlai nor the entrepreneurial behaviour of 'boss Protestants' were found in the diocese of Wenzhou. The church-state relations described by Cao reflect only the case of the Protestant community in Wenzhou, and it is difficult to draw the conclusion that a new form of church-state relations is emerging across the nation in the post-Mao reform era. Furthermore, the conceptual framework of institutional theory can be used to explain a multitude of church-state relations in the same social context, including cooperation and resistance. Even though institutional theory can provide an explanation for the cooperative relations between the local government and Protestant churches, it cannot exclude the antagonistic and conflictual relations between the local government and the Catholic Church. The case of Wenzhou Diocese has shown that institutional theory not only is useful in explaining the church-state pattern of domination and resistance between church and state, but also provides nuanced analyses of the multitude of resistant behaviours as demonstrated by the Catholic clergy in Wenzhou.
